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We present a computational study of attentional capture by 
meaning, based on Barnard et al's key-distractor attentional 
blink task. We highlight a sequence of models, from an 
abstract black-box to a structurally detailed white-box model. 
Each of these models reproduces the major findings from the 
key-distractor blink task. We argue that such multi-level 
modelling gives greater confidence in the theoretical position 
encapsulated by these models. 
Keywords: Attentional blink; LSA; semantic modulation; 
multi-level modeling. 
Introduction 
There are now many different approaches to the 
computational modelling of cognition, e.g. symbolic models 
(Newell 1990; Kieras and Meyer 1997), cognitive 
connectionist models (McLeod, Plunkett et al. 1998) and 
neurophysiologically prescribed connectionist models 
(O'Reilly and Munakata 2000). The relative value of 
different approaches is a hotly debated topic, with each 
presented as an alternative to the others, suggesting that they 
are in opposition to one another, e.g. (Fodor and Pylyshyn 
1988; Hinton 1990). However, another perspective is that 
these reflect different levels of abstraction / explanation of 
the same system that are complementary, rather than 
fundamentally opposed. 
Computer science, which has often been used as a 
metaphor in the cognitive modelling domain, gives a clear 
precedent for thinking in terms of multiple views of a single 
system. An illustration of this is what is now probably the 
most widely used design method, the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) (Booch, Rumbaugh et al. 1999). It is not 
that this perspective has been completely lost on cognitive 
scientists; indeed, Marr famously elaborated a version of 
this position in his three levels of cognitive description 
(Marr 2000). However, despite Marr's observations, 
concrete modelling endeavours rarely, if ever, consider 
multiple abstraction levels in the same context and 
particularly how to relate those levels. 
Multiple Level Cognitive Modelling 
In this paper, we can distinguish between the following two 
levels of explanation of a cognitive phenomenon. Firstly, 
high-level abstract descriptions of the mathematical 
characteristics of a pattern of data, e.g. (Stewart, Brown et 
al. 2005). Secondly, low-level detailed models of the 
internal structure of a cognitive system, e.g. (Dehaene, 
Kerszberg et al. 1998). These two levels of explanation 
really reflect different capacities to observe systems; that is, 
the extent to which the system is viewed from outside or 
inside, i.e., as a black or white box. There are clear pros and 
cons to these forms of modelling, which we discuss now. 
Black-box (Extensionalist) Modelling. With this approach, 
no assumptions are made about the internal structure of the 
system and there is no decomposition at all of the black-box 
into its constituent components. Thus, the point of reference 
for the modeller is the externally visible behaviour, e.g. the 
stimulus-response pattern. That is, such models are 
extensionalist in nature. A critical benefit of black-box 
modelling is that a minimal set of assumptions are made, 
especially in respect of the system structure. Consequently, 
there are less degrees of freedom and fewer hidden 
assumptions, making data fitting and parameter setting both 
well founded and, typically, feasible. For example, if the 
system can be described in closed form, key parameters can 
be determined by solving a set of equations, if not, 
computational search methods can be applied. 
White-box (Intensionalist) Modelling. In contrast, the 
internal (decompositional) structure of the system is 
asserted with this approach. That is, such models are 
intensionalist in nature. Although we can bring theories of 
cognitive architecture and (increasingly) neural structure to 
bear in proposing white-box models, a spectrum of 
assumptions (necessarily) needs to be made. Furthermore, 
typically, many of these assumptions concern the internal 
structure of the system. While structurally detailed models 
of cognition are likely to be the most revealing (especially 
with the current emphasis on neurophysiological correlates), 
deduction from these models is more slippery and 
potentially less well founded. Most importantly, many 
assumptions, such as settings of key parameters, need to be 
made, many of which may, at best, require complex 
justification and, at worst, be effectively arbitrary. As a 
result, parameter setting and data fitting is more difficult 
and, arguably, less well founded with white-box models. 
We can summarise then by saying that black-box 
modelling describes what a cognitive system does and it 
describes it in a relatively contained and well-founded 
manner. However, white-box modelling cannot be ignored, 
since it enables us to describe how a cognitive system 
functions, which is a concern for both traditional 
information processing and more recent neurophysiological 
explanations. Thus, when tackling the computational 
modelling of a particular cognitive phenomenon, one should 
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start with an abstract black-box analysis of the observable 
behaviour arising from the phenomenon. Then, from this 
solid foundation, one could develop increasingly refined and 
concrete models, in a progression towards white-box 
models. Importantly though, this approach enables cross 
abstraction level validation, showing, for example, that the 
white-box model is correctly related to the black-box model. 
This paper provides an initial step in the direction of 
multilevel cognitive modelling. In particular, the refinement 
we present is more from black to dark-gray, then to light-
gray! More complete instantiation of our approach awaits 
further theoretical work on how to relate the sorts of models 
developed in the cognitive modelling setting. 
A key contribution of the article will be the identification 
of analogous parameter manipulations in all the three 
models. These cross-model relationships effectively serve as 
a verification that the theoretical claims we make of our 
most intensionalist model are well-founded. 
Key-distractor Attentional Blink 
We illustrate our approach in the context of a study of 
temporal attention. To do this, we reproduce data on the 
key-distractor attentional blink task (Barnard, Scott et al. 
2004), which considers how attention is drawn to 
semantically salient items. A particular reason for focusing 
on this task is that it maps out the profile of attentional 
capture by meaning over time. This is encapsulated in the 
serial position curve; see Figure 1. 
In order to examine semantic effects, (Barnard, Scott et al. 
2004) used a variant of the Attentional Blink (AB) paradigm 
in which no perceptual features were present to distinguish 
targets from background items. In this task, words were 
presented at fixation in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation 
(RSVP) format, at around 10 items per second. Targets were 
only distinguishable from background items in terms of 
their meaning. This variant of the paradigm did not rely on 
dual target report. Rather, participants were simply asked to 
report a word if it refers to a job or profession for which 
people get paid, such as waitress, and these targets were 
embedded in background words that all belonged to the 
same category, e.g. nature words. However, streams also 
contained a key-distractor item, which, although not in the 
target category, was semantically related to that category. 
The serial-position that the target appeared after the key-
distractor was varied. 
Participants could report the target word (accurate report), 
say “Yes” if they were confident a job word had been there 
but could not say exactly what it was, or say “No” if they 
did not see a target, and there were trials on which no target 
was presented. When key-distractors were household items, 
a different category from both background and target words, 
there was little influence on target report.  However, key-
distractors that referenced a property of a human agent, but 
not one for which they were paid, like tourist or husband, 
gave rise to a classic and deep blink as shown in Figure 1a 
(e.g. the HS - Correct ID curve) & Figure 2b. The horizontal 
axis denotes lag, which indicates the serial position of the 
target relative to the key-distractor. The vertical axis denotes 
the proportion of each types of responses used. Thus, 
(Barnard, Scott et al. 2004) showed that the level of salience 
of the key-distractor, i.e. how related it is to the target 
category, modulates how strongly attention is captured. In 
this paper, we will concentrate on quantitatively modeling 
this key effect that semantic similarity modulates the blink 
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Figure 1 Proportion of different types of responses. HS and LS denote high and low salient condition respectively; 
Correct ID denotes correct report of target identity. “Yes” denotes response if subject was confidant a job word had 
been there but could not say exactly what it was. “No” denotes responses if subject did not see a target. 
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depth as shown in Figures 1a & 2b, and present both (black-
box) extensionalist and (white-box) intensionalist models. 
Extensionalist Model – Data Fitting 
The most extensionalist approach begins with behavioural 
data from Barnard’s key-distractor task. Accordingly, this 
model fits the behavioural data using a closed-form 
equation. This approach has been applied to almost every 
branch of science in order to characterise the observed 
behaviour and formulate mathematical models of the 
underlying mechanisms. This technique has also been 
widely used in modelling response time distributions (Van 
Zandt 2000) and, more recently, in modelling serial position 
curves of AB tasks (Cousineau, Charbonneau et al. 2006). 
In our context of exploring the key-distractor AB task, the 
human data has a sharp blink onset and shallow recovery as 
shown in Figure 1a (e.g. the HS - Correct ID curve) & 
Figure 2b. This shape matches an inverted Gamma 
distribution (GD). (Note, there is a shape parameter in the 
GD, which determines the skewness of the distribution. 
Increasing the shape parameter, moves the GD towards a 
normal distribution; decreasing it, moves the GD towards an 
exponential distribution.) Hence, we use the following 
equation to model our AB curves. 
 
)()( xybaxf ⋅+=  
 
where x denotes lag; a is the baseline parameter, which sets 
baseline performance and, thus, performance following 
blink recovery; b is the depth parameter, which sets the 
difference between the deepest point of the blink and the 
baseline; and y(x) denotes the GD, which also has 
parameters. However, b is the only parameter that changes 
significantly when different key-distractors are used in the 
experiment. The function becomes the baseline if b is 0, i.e. 
complete absence of the blink and baseline performance at 
all lags. Hence, we argue that b is related to salience of the 
key-distractor and thus characterises the attentional capture 
by salience effect we are interested in. 
A simple search of the parameter space has proved 
sufficient to yield a good fit to the experimental data. We 
show this fit in Figure 1b. Note, the ratio of the b parameter 
between low and high salient conditions is around 
44.09.0/4.0 ≈ . Moreover, the GD shape parameter is 
relatively small for all curves. This suggests that the blink 
curves are asymmetrical. It will become clear that this 
relationship is consistent among our different models.  
Intermediate Model – Intrinsic Identification 
In this section, we model the internal structure of the system 
as shown in Figure 2a. Three principles underlie our model: 
sequential processing, 2-stages and serial allocation of 
attention. We discuss these principles in turn. 
Sequential Processing. With any RSVP task, items arrive 
in sequence and need to be correspondingly processed. 
Thus, we require a basic method for representing this 
sequential arrival and processing of items.  At one level, we 
can view our approach as implementing a pipeline. New 
items enter the front of the pipeline from the visual system; 
they are then fed through until they reach the back of the 
pipeline, where they enter working memory (WM). Every 
cycle, a new item enters the pipeline and all items currently 
in transit are pushed along one place. The key data structure 
that implements this pipeline metaphor is a delay-line as 
shown in Figure 2a. It could also be viewed as a symbolic 
analogue of a sequence of layers in a neural network; a 
particularly strong analogue being with synfire chains 
(Abeles, Bergman et al. 1993). It is a very natural 
mechanism to use in order to capture the temporal properties 
of a blink experiment, which is inherently a time 
constrained order task. 
2-Stages. Like (Chun and Potter 1995; Bowman and Wyble 
2007), (Barnard, Scott et al. 2004) and (Barnard and 
Bowman 2004) argued for a two-stage model, but this time 
recast to focus exclusively on semantic analysis and 
executive processing. In particular, (Barnard and Bowman 
2004) modelled the key-distractor blink task using a two-
stage model. In the first stage, a generic level of semantic 
representation is monitored and initially used to determine if 
an incoming item is salient in the context of the specified 
task. If it is found to be so, then, in the second stage, the 
specific referential meaning of the word is subjected to 
detailed semantic scrutiny; thus, a word’s meaning is 
actively evaluated in relation to the required referential 
properties of the target category. If this reveals a match, 
then the target is encoded for later report. The first of these 
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Figure 2 (a) Internal structure. (b) Target report accuracy 
by lag in humans for high and low salient key-distractors 
with intrinsic identifications. (c) Salience assignment. 
Semantics in LSA are expressed in a high dimensional 
space. This illustration is 2D for ease of depiction. 
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meaning, with the second akin to taking a closer “look” at 
the relationship to the meaning of the target category. These 
two stages are implemented in two distinct subsystems as 
shown in Figure 2a: the implicational subsystem or Implic 
and the propositional subsystem or Prop (Barnard 1999). 
(We consider how these subsystems fit into a larger 
cognitive framework, ICS, in the conclusion.) 
These two subsystems process qualitatively distinct types 
of meaning. One, implicational meaning, is holistic, abstract 
and schematic, and is where affect is represented and 
experienced (Barnard 1999). The other is classically 
“rational”, being based upon propositional representation, 
capturing referentially specific semantic properties and 
relationships. Semantic errors make clear that sometimes we 
only have (referentially non-specific) semantic gist 
information available to us, e.g. the Noah illusion illustrates 
implicational meaning (Erickson and Mattson 1981). 
Serial Allocation of Attention. Our third principle is a 
mechanism of attentional engagement. It is only when 
attention is engaged at a subsystem that it can assess the 
salience of items passing through it. Furthermore, attention 
can only be engaged at one subsystem at a time. 
Consequently, semantic processes cannot glance at an 
incoming item, while looking at and scrutinising another. 
This constraint will play an important role in generating a 
blink in our models. When attention is engaged at a 
subsystem, we say that it is buffered (Barnard 1999). (In the 
context of this paper, the term buffer refers to a moving 
focus of attention.) Thus, salience assignment can only be 
performed if the subsystem is buffered and only one 
subsystem can be buffered at a time as shown in Figure 2a. 
The buffer mechanism ensures that the central attentional 
resources are allocated serially, while items pass 
concurrently, i.e. all items throughout the overall delay-line 
are moved on one place on each time step. 
How the Model Blinks. In this model, words are expressed 
by their roles in Barnard et al’s blink task, i.e. background, 
target, and key-distractor, which has two subtypes: high 
salient and low salient. The buffer movement dynamic 
provides the underlying mechanism for the blink. 
Initially, Implic is buffered as shown in Figure 2a. When, 
in response to the key-distractor being found implicationally 
salient, the buffer moves from Implic to Prop, salience 
assessment cannot be performed on a set of words (i.e. a 
portion of the RSVP stream) entering Implic following the 
key-distractor. So, when these implicationally uninterpreted 
words are passed to Prop, propositional meaning (which 
builds on implicational meaning) cannot be accessed. Target 
words falling within this window will not be detected as 
implicationally salient and thus will not be reported. 
There is normally lag-1 sparing in key-distractor AB 
experiments, i.e. a target word immediately following the 
key-distractor is likely to be reported. This arises in our 
model because buffer movement takes time, hence, the word 
immediately following the key-distractor may be 
implicationally interpreted before the buffer moves to Prop.  
When Prop is buffered and detects an implicationally 
uninterpreted word, the buffer is passed back to Implic, 
which can assign salience to its items again. After this, 
target words entering the system will be detected as 
implicationally and propositionally salient and thus will be 
reported. Hence, the blink recovers. 
Generating a Blink Curve. Humans though perceive 
information imperfectly; as a result, salient items may be 
missed. In the current model, we assume that the ease of 
detecting that the key-distractor is implicationally salient 
determines the depth of the blink curve. We work here with 
what we call “intrinsic probabilities of identification”, i.e. if 
an item (distractor or target) is presented alone in an RSVP 
stream, what is the probability that it will be seen. Thus, 
)( rgTaDistP
imp
∧  is not the probability that both the key-
distractor and target are seen in an AB setting, but rather the 
probability that both would be seen in two separate idealised 
“single target events”. The intrinsic probability of judging 
targets to be implicationally salient, 67.0)( =rgTaP
imp
, is set 
by the baseline performance of human subjects. (Barnard et 
al stated that humans correctly report the target’s identity on 
average on 67% of target only trials; furthermore, at high 
lags, the blink curve also recovers to this baseline 
performance (Barnard, Scott et al. 2004).) We assume that 
the intrinsic probability of detecting a background word as 
implicationally salient, )(BackP
imp
, is zero. (This sort of 
error is so rare as to be effectively zero.) The intrinsic 
probability of detecting a key-distractor as implicationally 
salient is )(HSP
imp
 in the high salient condition and 
)(LSP
imp
 in the low salient condition. According to our 
model, the likelihood of correct report at the deepest point in 
the blink curve reflects the joint probability of missing the 
key-distractor and detecting the target. This is because the 
way the model is constructed, there is indeed no other way 
that a target can be detected during the blink. From Figure 
2b, 34.0)( =∧¬ rgTaHSP
imp
 and 54.0)( =∧¬ rgTaLSP
imp
 
can be obtained. We assume detecting targets and the key-
distractors are independent, in particular, in both cases we 
assume the buffer is at Implic when the assessment is made. 
So, 49.0)( =HSP
imp
 and 19.0)( =LSP
imp
. 
This calculation quantitatively determines how the model 
generates a blink curve. As a reflection of the relatively high 
level of abstraction of this model, randomness is imposed 
globally and externally using a convolution. This technique 
does not require specification of either the dynamics or the 
source of noise inside the model. As a result, assumptions 
about the internal structure of the system are minimised and 
also the number of simulation runs is reduced. Thus, we 
convolve Gaussian-distributed noise (GDN) with the (noise 
free) simulation results. We also gradually increase the 
deviation of the GDN by serial position, i.e. the GDN is 
narrower at earlier lags and broader at later lags. We call 
this a convolution with sliding noise. (Note, we explored 
simpler convolution strategies, but none of these generated a 
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suitable blink curve, see (Bowman, Su et al. 2006) for 
details). The intuition behind this approach is that there is 
less noise in earlier phases of processing than in later phases 
of processing, which influence blink onset and recovery 
respectively. Application of such a convolution with sliding 
noise results in a good fit to the human data as shown in 
Figure 1c. Note, our extensionalist model achieves this blink 
curve asymmetry by setting the GD shape parameter, which 
determines how skewed it is from a normal distribution. 
In our simulations, the meaning of a target word can be 
processed to three different degrees, which, we argue, 
reflect different types of response. Words that are both 
implicationally and propositionally fully interpreted can be 
reported correctly with their identity. Some target words can 
be implicationally fully un-interpreted, reflecting complete 
unawareness of the presence of target words, i.e. the “No” 
responses. Finally, some target words can be partially 
processed, reflecting the “Yes” response. 
The resulting percentages of correct report of target 
identities, “No” responses and “Yes” responses are shown in 
Figure 1c. These graphs also illustrate the difference in 
performance between the high and low salience conditions. 
The results are consistent with the experimental results from 
humans (Barnard, Scott et al. 2004) shown in the same 
graph. Moreover, the ratio between low and high salient 
key-distractor intrinsic probabilities of identification is 
39.049.0/19.0 ≈ , which is similar to the ratio of the depth 
parameters (0.44) in the previous model. 
Intensionalist Model – LSA 
In previous models, parameters were derived from human 
performance on the AB task and assumptions about the 
internal structure were minimized. However, in this model, 
word meanings are represented using Latent Semantic 
Analysis (LSA) (Landauer and Dumais 1997), which was 
developed outside the AB. In this sense, this model’s key 
parameters were constrained by a general theory that will be 
used to explain the intrinsic probability and the depth 
parameter in our previous models.  
We hypothesize that a word is assigned to be salient if the 
semantic distance (an LSA cosine) between the word and 
the target category is smaller than a specified threshold. As 
shown in Figure 2c, the target words are within the 
propositional salience threshold. Hence, they are both 
implicationally and propositionally salient. On the other 
hand, background words are outside the implicational 
salience threshold. Hence, they are both implicationally and 
propositionally unsalient. Key-distractors can be either 
implicational salient or unsalient. However, they cannot be 
propositionally salient. Only job words can be reported and 
only implicationally salient key-distractors can cause blinks.  
In this model, the depth of the blink curve depends on the 
percentage of key-distractors above the implicational 
threshold. We calculated the LSA cosines in relation to the 
meanings: generic human, generic occupation, generic 
payment, generic household and nature categories (Barnard, 
Scott et al. 2004). Then, we integrated these cosines as a 
weighted sum of these five LSA values. Effectively, we 
"skew" the LSA space according to the extraction of 
implicational meaning. The five weights characterise this 
skewing, reflecting the relative emphasis that the 
implicational schema puts on each of the five dimensions. 
We constructed a two layer neural network to determine 
these weights. The input layer contained five neurons, one 
for each of the five categories. The output layer was a single 
neuron. We trained the network using all the words we used 
in the AB experiment. The learning algorithm used was the 
delta rule (O'Reilly and Munakata 2000). The inputs were 
LSA cosines and the expected output was 1 for targets and 0 
for non-targets. The learning finished when the weights 
settled, i.e. their changes were smaller than a given value 
(0.0001). Using the trained network, we calculated the new 
LSA values for all words. The results were: 52.5% of high 
salient and 22.2% of low salient key-distractors were 
implicationally salient. Nature words were mainly 
implicationally unsalient, except for one word (so, we 
excluded this word from our simulation). 63.4% of target 
words were implicationally salient. Interestingly, the ratio 
between low and high salient key-distractor LSA 
calculations was 42.05.52/2.22 ≈ , which is consistent with 
the depth parameters (0.44) and intrinsic probabilities (0.39) 
derived from our previous model. 
As a reflection of the fact that this is a more concrete 
model than the previous ones, convolutions are not used 
here. Instead, different amounts of variance are added to the 
buffer movement delay at different stages, i.e. less variance 
is added to the delay of buffer movement from Implic to 
Prop (which regulates blink onset) than the delay of buffer 
movement in the opposite direction (which regulates blink 
offset). Our extensionialist and intermediate models justify 
this, i.e. GD is a skewed distribution and the sliding noise 
ensures that the variance increases by lag. Partial responses 
are modelled in a similar way as the intermediate model. 
The simulation results are shown in Figure 1d. Full details 
of these models can be found in (Bowman, Su et al. 2006). 
Conclusion 
Attentional Capture by Meaning. We have provided a 
concrete account of attentional capture by meaning and the 
temporal dynamics of that process. A number of key 
findings have arisen from our modelling. Firstly, we have 
provided further evidence for the applicability of LSA in the 
context of attentional capture by meaning. That is, we have 
shown that a model that measures semantic distance using 
LSA can reproduce the key-distractor blink and semantic 
modulations of blink depth. Furthermore, we have shown 
that these LSA calculations are consistent with more 
extensionalist approaches in which the difference in 
observable behaviour is captured by either the GD depth 
parameter, or intrinsic probabilities of ascribing 
implicational salience derived directly from the blink curve. 
Importantly, in all three cases, i.e. GD depth parameter, 
intrinsic probabilities of implicational salience and LSA 
measures of implicational salience, the ratio between high 
1525
and low salience has been almost identical (around 0.42). 
This is an illustration of how multilevel modelling can 
provide converging evidence for a theoretical position. 
Secondly, we have clarified the characteristics of 
attentional redeployment when meaning captures attention. 
In particular, at an extensionalist level, a skewed 
distribution was used to characterise the asymmetry of the 
blink curve. At an intermediate level, the need to use a 
convolution with sliding noise suggests that temporal noise 
increases systematically by serial position. At an 
intensionalist level, this sliding noise is realised as variance 
in the buffer movement delay. This finding suggests that 
there is less variance in extracting semantic gist (at Implic) 
than extracting referential meaning (at Prop), since Implic 
does not have to fully analysis and generate a concrete 
referent, which is likely to be affected by many variables. 
This consistency is again an illustration of converging 
evidence from different levels of modelling. 
Cognitive Architectures. The general applicability of our 
models is enhanced since the approach can be placed within 
the context of a broad cognitive theory: the Interacting 
Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) architecture (Barnard 1999). 
Distributed control is inherent in ICS: subsystems are 
independent components, which interact through exchange 
of data representations over communication channels 
(Barnard 1999; Bowman and Faconti 1999; Barnard and 
Bowman 2004). ICS asserts that cognition emerges as the 
product of the interaction between a set of autonomous 
subsystems. Both the delay-line and buffering concepts that 
we use have their roots in ICS. However, most significantly, 
the implicational - propositional distinction reflects ICS' 
dual-subsystem central engine (Teasdale and Barnard 1993). 
Multi-level Cognitive Modelling. We have provided a case 
study for how multilevel modelling can be applied in the 
cognition setting. Viewing systems from different 
perspectives and levels of abstraction is just a useful 
exploratory method for understanding systems, and it is one 
that the cognitive modelling domain should not miss.  
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